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The curves in Fig. I are continuous approximations of the parameters actually used in the experimental markets. The markets first exist under conditions D1 and according to theory the emerging prices should be near to one of the stable equilibria. Presumably prices will converge only to the stable equilibria. If demand is shifted to D2 then prices and volume should move to one of the other equilibria because every stable equilibria under D1 is unstable under D2. This relationship among the equilibria is the key to the experiments reported in the paper.
Two major problems present themselves to anyone who attempts to conduct experiments suggested by these stability concepts. The first and most difficult is determining a method for experimentally inducing a negatively sloped supply. The markets created for this study all have 'forward falling' as opposed 440 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MAY Table I  Redemption Value Table for franc/dollar conversion rate was o04 cent per franc for demanders and I I cent per franc, I5 cent per franc and I5 cent per franc for the three types of sellers, respectively. After the first three experiments, which operated very slowly relative to the other experiments, the rates were 25 % less for buyers and 50 % less for sellers. The conversion rates were chosen to provide adequate incentives near the system equilibria.
A. The Demand Curve
Six agents were designated as demanders. These demanders were partitioned into two demanders of each of three types of agents. The redemption values are in Table i . Buyers were given two tables. One contained their marginal redemption values for all periods, and the other contained totals. Two different aggregate demands were used. These are labelled condition D1 and condition D2 as shown in Fig. 2 . In most experiments a shift of demand occurred in period Io. The first ten periods were under condition D1 and then the demand was shifted to D2. However, in some experiments conditions D1 were maintained longer than ten periods to see if convergence to a theoretical equilibrium would become 'closer' with more periods under the same demand conditions.
B. The Supply Curve
The literature discusses three forms of negatively sloped supply. The 'backward bending' curve is usually associated with 'backward bending' individual supplies derived from negative income effects. The backward bending labour supplies are the typical example. The second form is the 'forward falling' supply curve associated with the existence of an externality. According to the forward falling concept, specialisation in resource functions and resource supplies has the effect of lowering costs as an industry grows. Competition is maintained in the forward falling case because individual firms have upward sloping marginal costs, given the volume of others. However, costs fall as the volume of others increases. Lowered costs are translated to lower prices through competition. The third form of negative sloped supply involves falling average cost at the individual firm level over the whole range of demand. This latter case theoretically results in monopoly.
Our choice was to study the second form. The first, backward bending, necessitated the existence of at least two commodities. Conceptually, the appropriate two commodities could be created in a laboratory setting but practical problems associated with experimental methodology precluded an immediate examination of this case. The third form is interesting and has received some attention experimentally. The monopoly case, however, is not in the full spirit of the Marshallian vs. Walrasian stability issue. Our decision was to study the second 'forward falling' form.
The forward falling supply curve is usually attributed to 'external economies' of scale. As market volume increases, the cost to each firm decreases even though an individual firm's cost increases with an increase in its own volume (volume of other firms held constant 
The theory of consistent conjectures yields qe X, for all i(3) J*i at equilibrium. Together the theory of competitive market supply gives a summation of (2), over n firms, and substitution from (3) yields a market supply function XS = s(P) .
The continuous approximations of the actual parameters used in the experimental markets will make the model precise. Let aci be parameters specific to seller i. By assumption , and y are paranieters common to all sellers. The cost function of each firm is given by:
The data were given to subjects in total cost tables which were evaluations of (5) and also in the form of marginal cost tables which were evaluations of (*) Three different organisations were studied. The first is the double auction. In this process buyers tender bids and sellers tender asks publicly. Trading is open for a limited period of time4 with a large number of potential bids and asks possible. One important feature of this organisation is that market volume; i.e. the volume of others, is observed during a period. Participants are able to make decisions during a period contingent upon the volume that has already occurred in that period. Sellers also know that their own volume will affect the costs of others in ways that might induce others to sell more. Thus, from a practical point of view, the double auction has potentially important features.
The second organisation studied was a sealed bid/offer market (see Smith et al., i 982). Buyers and sellers each list the prices at which they wish to buy or sell each unit. That is, each participant submits a demand or supply function. These functions are aggregated in the ordinary way and the equilibrium is computed. The last accepted and first excluded demand and supply units determine the price. The market price is computed to be midway between the minimum of the last accepted bid and first rejected offer and the maximum of the last accepted offer and first rejected bid.
The second organisation is interesting for two reasons. First, because of the 'excluded price auction' feature, demand revealing aspects exist, though this is not to imply that this mechanism is demand revealing.5 Second, a special case of the sealed offer institution is that in which suppliers bring a fixed quantity to the market that they will sell whatever the price. In any case, suppliers cannot make their offers contingent upon the actions of others in these markets so one might expect the stability if not the equilibrating properties of this process to differ from the double oral auction.
The third process is the secant tatonnement which is studied for the first time in this paper. In this process the experimenter (price adjuster) announces a price. Agents respond with quantity offers at that price. If excess demand is zero, or if some other stopping rule is involved, the process stops and trade takes place at the announcement price. If conditions for stopping are not satisfied, then the secant method for finding a new price is used and a new price is announced.
Price changes were determined by the secant formula If I (Pt -Pt,) / (EDt -EDt-1) is small enough, then a rounding procedure will treat the quantity as zero and the process stops even though excess demand is not zero. This latter property can be important in cases of horizontal demand or supply curves. The formula and stopping rules were on the chalkboard with examples for all to see and study. Very little is known about the behaviour of tatonnement processes. Operational problems involved with implementing such a process abound. The secant process as opposed to a process often referenced in the literature as the ' proportional adjustment rule' (i.e. X = acED) was chosen as the first to study because the natural stopping rules listed above could be applied in the presence of discontinuities.6 III. MODELS Two aspects of the economic environment are of interest. The first is the set of equilibria and the second is the detail of the dynamic models. The classical analysis will be maintained throughout the paper. That is, only the market demand and supply functions will be used as the basic parameters of the environment. We will indicate those points where we are aware that this classical model produces results inconsistent with modern game theory.
The Walrasian definition is not the same as the Marshallian definition. The Walrasian definition has a price to be an equilibrium if the quantity demanded at that price equals the quantity supplied at that price. The Marshallian definition has a quantity to be in equilibrium if the demand price and supply price are equal at that quantity. Both authors also defined equilibria as limit points of a dynamic process. This latter distinction is not so important if the curves are continuous as they are in Fig. i but special problems occur when the curves are discrete as in Fig. 2 .
The literature appears to contain no discussion of problems caused by discontinuities so latitude remains to apply these theories in ways that appear reasonable. In this paper an equilibrium is either a point that satisfies a static definition or it is the limit point of a dynamic process as defined by one of the two dynamic theories. Alternative ways of comparing the models exist. The analysis above treated quantity as the only observable variable (Assumption 3) and left the price to be determined by theory (Assumption 4). Alternatively, the price could have been taken to be the only observable variable while allowing quantity to be determined by theory, i.e. min {Xd, X}. Since both prices and quantities are actually observable, no need exists to impose any such structure for purposes of estimation. The two equations in (I 3) can be estimated independently without imposing assumptions like (3) or (4z).
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
A total of twelve experiments were conducted. Announce P* = 400, X* = I8 after periods I I and I2
I2
Tatonnement D1 periods I-9 D2 periods Io-I9
Announce P* = 400, X* = I8 after periods I I and I 2 t Public information at the end of a period included the highest bid, lowest bid, lowest accepted bid, and highest accepted ask, price, and volume. $ The highest rejected bid and lowest rejected ask were announced along with the information described in footnote t.
The first three of these four were conducted under constant demand conditions as single unit double oral auctions (DOA). The DOA process required more time than was anticipated. In addition the system was not equilibrating as anticipated so a decision was made to keep demand constant. Since the multiple unit double auction (MUDA) used in experiment 4 is faster,7 a demand shift was implemented in that market. Experiments 5, 6, 7 and 8 were conducted as sealed bid offer (SBO) auctions. For these, because of the speed of the market, we were able to implement the shifting demand design as planned.
Experiments 9, i o, i i, and I2 were all secant tatonnement. Demand was held at D1 for the first nine periods and was shifted to D2 beginning the tenth period. Demand condition D2 was maintained for two to four periods after which the experiment terminated or an experimenter intervention occurred as explained below. In some experiments an experimenter intervention occurred in the form of a public announcement that demonstrated8 the existence of an equilibrium (Marshallian stable and Walrasian unstable) at P* = 400, X*I = 8. These interventions came at times after the primary objectives of the research had already been completed and an opportunity existed to explore secondary objectives at a very low marginal cost. The intervention represented an exploratory check to see if the market would stay at a Marshallian stable (Walrasian unstable) point if the market was 'placed' there. The data from these interventions were not used in the analysis but are reproduced for the interested reader. However, by virtue of the experimental design, it is unlikely to observe bk > 0 for both values of k since over wide ranges of the variables the models differ only by a negative constant of proportionality. However, the models are estimated separately because differences can occur in certain areas of the observation space because of the nonlinearities. The models were estimated over several restricted data sets. First all of the data prior to announcements were used. Then the models were checked using only first period data. The models were also estimated with the inclusion of data after announcements. These perturbations of the data resulted in no changes in the conclusions. The estimates in Table 5 are those for the data before any parameter announcements were made. Since the announcements were not implemented sufficiently systematically to be considered as treatment variables for purposes of statistical analysis, the data after announcements were not used to obtain the regression results reported in In Table 5 The support for the Marshallian model is not all positive. Both theories predict that the intercept term will be zero. As shown in Table 5 , dk is significantly negative for two of the three processes according to the Marshallian model. However, the magnitudes are small. We conjecture that they result from nonlinearities in the adjustment process or perhaps from the fact that the markets tended to equilibrate with volumes less than the equilibrium. 
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